A specification and top-level refinement of a simple mine pump control system, as well as a proof of correctness of the refinement, are presented as an example of the application of a formal method for the development of time-based systems. The overall approach makes use of a refinement calculus for timed systems, similar to the refinement calculi for sequential programs.
Introduction
Formal methods for the development of sequential programs have been available for some time, and more recently we have seen the development of refinement calculi for sequential programs [1, 14, 15] . An important feature of refinement calculi is the integration of specification and programming constructs into the same framework, so that a smooth transition can be made from a top-level specification down to implementation detail.
The objective of this paper is to present a simple but realistic example of the use of a refinement calculus for time-based systems. We present a case study of the specification, analysis and top-level design of a mine monitoring and control system. In specifying such a system, we need to be able to discuss both continuous quantities, such as the water level in the mine, and discrete properties, such as whether or not the water pump is on. The approach taken models both continuous and discrete properties as functions of time within the same framework, and provides for the expression of relationships between these -usually separate -aspects of a system. The approach taken to specification is novel from a computer science viewpoint, but is, however, not completely new: it follows the approach to modelling systems that has been used by physicists and engineers for quite some time.
Another important aspect of the approach is that a clear distinction is made between the assumptions made about the environment of a system (or a component of a design) and the effect the system (or component) is expected to achieve. This separation allows for the use of a timed refinement methodology for the development and verification of successive design steps. This separation has the same advantages for timed specifications as the separation of pre-condition and post-condition in the specification of sequential programs.
Our example of a mine monitoring and control system is adapted from [2] . In that paper Burns and Lister elucidate an architectural framework for timely and reliable distributed information systems (TARDIS). The present paper is our attempt to formalise the specification and top-level design components of that architecture in a way which includes the timing properties of the system.
Specification
We have attempted to develop as general a specification of the mine monitoring and control system as possible, without biasing the system towards a particular form of implementation. Further we have developed a whole-system specification, rather than just a specification of the software components of the system. We consider the division of the implementation into hardware and software components to be part of the top-level design of the system, and that the top-level design process should be supported by our methodology.
For example, an implementation may use either a software monitor to regularly sample the water level in the mine, or it may use hardware to trigger an interrupt when the water level in the mine exceeds a critical level. A top-level specification of the whole system should allow both of these implementation strategies, and the design process should make it possible to calculate design parameters such as the maximum time between successive samplings of the water level.
In our specifications we make use of the Z mathematical and schema notations. A glossary of terminology used in this paper is provided in Appendix A. The reader is referred to [19, 5] for more detail on Z. We extend the Z notation with three (orthogonal) notational devices to facilitate the specification of real time systems: units (including dimensionality) of (physical) quantities, (topologically) continuous functions of both analogue and discrete quantities, and specification statements which specify the assumptions a process makes about its environment and the effect it is guaranteed to achieve.
We give an introduction to these techniques in Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.
Units
In specifying variables we follow the approach, commonly used in physics and engineering, of giving the (physical) units of the quantity. For example, the depth of the water in the mine is given in metres, so we introduce a type DEPTH which is a real number (R is the set of reals) with units of metres:
Similarly, we introduce a type TIME which is a real number with units of seconds: TIME b
= R Seconds]:
A variable giving the depth at which the water level becomes dangerous can be declared using type DEPTH:
As another example, the maximum rate of increase of water level could also be given by a variable:
This variable is a real number with units of metres per second.
As our treatment of units is based on the familiar approach used in physics and engineering, we do not give all the details of our approach here. The interested reader is referred to [6, 12] for more details.
Continuous functions
To model time-varying quantities we take the simple approach of using a continuous function from TIME to the type of the quantity. For example, the water level in the mine can be modelled by:
We use the symbol 'Q' to indicate a total continuous function. The water level at time t is given by H 2 O(t). In this case as the domain and range of the function are both real-valued, we have the normal continuous function of real analysis.
In mathematics, the notion of continuity has been generalised to topological continuity. For analogue functions, such as H 2 O above, topological continuity corresponds to the usual real continuity, but one advantage of the topological generalisation is that we can discuss continuous functions with discrete ranges. For example, the water pump may be on or off. We can model the status of the pump by a continuous function from time to Boolean:
Pumping : TIME P B :
In this case the function is partial: it is not defined for all elements in its domain. In fact, the times at which it is not defined are the times at which the pump status is changing (or undefined). we may be sure that Pumping is true over all of ∆, and that it is undefined at the endpoints of ∆. ∆ forms the entirety of some interval of time during which Pumping is true.
In using topologically, continuous functions we are able, for the most part, to consider the behaviour of any system at the level of intervals of time, rather than being forced to consider its behaviour in terms of individual instants of time. In this way the complexity involved in using the real numbers to model analogue quantities is held in check.
Timed history predicates When dealing with process state described as a function of time, it is convenient to introduce shorthand notations that allow commonly occurring forms of predicates to be expressed more succinctly. For example, to state that the water is below the danger level for the duration of CriticalPeriod, we can use the following timed history predicate:
It has the same meaning as the following:
The specification statement
To specify a system (or component process of a system) we need to define both the assumptions that the system makes of its environment and the effect it guarantees to achieve if placed in such an environment. As well, we enumerate the system variables that are constructed by the process. We use a specification statement to group these aspects of a specification together. It takes the form:
where ConstructedVariables is a list of variable declarations, and Assumption and Effect are (essentially) predicates.
The idea of a specification statement comes from [14] , however, it has been adapted to the current context of timed histories rather than sequential programs.
For realistic specifications the predicates defining the assumptions and effects can become quite large. To help manage these predicates we make use of the Z schemas [19] to group together a list of variables with declared types and a predicate, and we use these schemas to define the assumption and effect predicates. This approach has the advantage that the assumption and effect schemas also make explicit the variables over which they are defined.
Z schemas can be used to group together variables defining the state of a process. For the mine monitoring system the state consists of the water level and the rates of flow of water into and out of the mine. These can be grouped together in a schema called Water:
The mine monitoring system assumes that the rate of flow of water into the mine is bounded by MaxH 2 Oin. We can write a Z schema to capture this condition:
WaterRateLimited Water H 2 Oin < MaxH 2 Oin on TIME These schemas define properties of systems or processes. To specify a process that has the effect of setting the flag if the water level exceeds the danger level, assuming that the rate of flow of water into the mine is below the given maximum rate, we can use the following specification statement:
In this case H 2 OFlag is a variable completely constructed by the process.
Case study: specification
As an example of the use of our techniques for the specification of real-time processes, we consider the case of a mine-shaft pump system. This real-time case study has been treated by several authors [2, 3, 17, 18] and thus provides the opportunity to contrast our approach with that of others. In particular, we are able to attack the problem at a higher level of abstraction than is common, presenting a top-level specification rather than the design-oriented presentations in [2, 3, 17, 18] .
The case study considered seeks to address the problem of water seepage in a mining shaft. The intention is to construct a process to monitor and control the water levels, so as to minimise the risk that the mine will need to be evacuated due to dangerously high water levels. Since activity within the mine is considered dangerous when high levels of methane gas are present, the process must also monitor the level of methane so that operations may be stopped during such danger periods.
Our purpose is to construct a formal description of the mine system and then use this system model to describe the process which will help guard against interruptions to mining operations caused by water seepage.
Monitoring the mine
Working conditions in the mine are monitored by various sensors which measure important safety parameters. We are primarily interested in those which affect the control of water levels in the mine, but others may exist (such as the air flow and carbon monoxide sensors discussed in [2] ).
Water
Water tends to seep into the mine shafts from the surrounding water table. The depth of water in the mine is measured in metres.
DEPTH b = R Metre]
We model the water system in the mine as a sink into which and out of which water may flow.
Water H 2 O : TIME Q DEPTH H 2 Oin H 2 Oout : TIME Q (DEPTH =TIME ) 8 t t 0 : TIME t < t 0 )
The mine is capable of continuing operation with a certain amount of water in the shaft, but if the water level exceeds DangerH 2 O : DEPTH it will be necessary to take emergency action to ensure the safety of the workers in the mine. The monitor system is required to set a flag to indicate the existence of dangerous water levels. We represent this flag as a continuous, boolean history. Continuous histories with values in a discrete space, like the booleans, change value by becoming undefined for some period of time. In the case of flags we require that such state changes occur over a single instant of time.
The set Flag is closed under the pointwise application of (finite numbers of) boolean operators, provided we handle the instants of undefinedness appropriately. Thus for f g : Flag, if we define : f , f^g, f _ g, f ) g, and f , g by applying the operators pointwise, with the result being undefined whenever an operand is undefined, then each of these functions is also in Flag.
The water alarm flag must be set whenever the water is above the dangerous level. on the rate at which the water level rises over all time.
WaterAlarm
WaterRateLimited Water H 2 Oin < MaxH 2 Oin on TIME The water monitoring process is then required to raise the water danger flag whenever the water level is critical, provided that the rate at which the water level rises is sufficiently steady. We write this formally using a specification statement.
The water alarm flag is a construction of WaterMonitor, which must act to ensure that the effect WaterAlarm is achieved, provided that the assumption WaterRateLimited is satisfied.
Methane
Mining operations tend to cause the occasional release of trapped methane gas. High partial pressures of methane in the mine atmosphere can make the use of mining equipment hazardous so methane levels are also monitored. Pressures are measured in Pascals.
PRESSURE b = R Pascal]
As with the water level, we represent the methane level in the mine as a methane sink with inflows and outflows of methane. The final requirement of the mine monitoring system is that an alarm be raised when any of the mine parameters become safety critical. Note that the RaiseAlarm schema may be modified to allow the introduction of other safety critical flags simply by factoring them into the above disjunction.
RaiseAlarm
The action of the full monitoring system is then to detect safety critical levels of water or methane and when this occurs to sound an alarm.
The water and methane monitors act in parallel, which we write
The parallel composition of two specifications forms a process which achieves the effects of both processes, provided the assumptions of both processes are satisfied. Note that extra monitoring functions may be added to the alarm system by simply redefining Monitors so as to include them in parallel with the existing water and methane monitors. The job of the alarm system is then to monitor the water and methane flags constructed by these monitors and to sound the alarm when they are set. Thus the alarm system operates in the environment created by the monitor systems. We express this using the piping operator, " ".
MineMonitor b
= Monitors (Alarm : true RaiseAlarm])
Controlling water levels
In order to reduce the number of disruptions to the mine's operation due to high water levels it is considered desirable to implement a process for controlling the water level. The desired efficiency of the water level control process is that it should ensure that dangerous water levels occur less than once in every one thousand mining shifts. We represent the collection of all shifts as a time-ordered sequence of disjoint time-periods.
MineWork
Shift : seq(T TIME ) 8 m n : dom Shift m < n ) (8t : Shift m ; t 0 : Shift n t < t 0 )
We formalise the efficiency requirement as: in any thousand consecutive shifts, at most one will be disrupted by dangerous water levels.
ControlWater WaterAlarm MineWork 8 m n : dom Shift #(m::n) 1000 ) #fk : m::
We are presented with the question of under what conditions would it be feasible to achieve this effect. As any equipment used to achieve this effect will take time to react to rising water levels, we must require that there be a bound on the rate at which the water flows into the mine. This is the assumption WaterRateLimited introduced above.
Further, we know that the presence of high levels of methane makes the use of equipment in the mine dangerous. It is reasonable to assume that long or frequent periods of dangerous methane levels will make the goal of controlling water levels difficult. Let TooMuchCH 4 : TIME represent the maximum duration of dangerous methane levels over a single shift and let
represent the maximum number of occurrences of periods of dangerous methane levels over a single shift, which would be compatible with the effective operation of the water level control process. That is, it is not possible to guarantee effective control of the water level when these bounds are exceeded during a shift. We require that such sustained high levels of methane occur no more than once in every one thousand shifts. Our final requirement is more subtle. The water level control system will most likely act by removing water from the mine shaft. We must therefore require that there is no impediment to the removal of water from the mine shaft. This condition corresponds to the system observable H 2 Oout being free to assume any value from its type domain.
SafeMethane
WaterRemovable Water free(H 2 Oout TIME Q (DEPTH =TIME ))
The predicate free is a modal logic operator which states that it is possible for its first argument to attain any value in the set determined by the second argument. Using the modal logic operator 3 (read possibly [8] ) the above condition may be expressed by 8 f : TIME Q (DEPTH =TIME ) (3 H 2 Oout = f ):
The action of the water level control process is then specified by 
Refinement
Refinement calculi have been developed for sequential systems by Back [1] , Morgan [14] and Morris [15] . These calculi all make use of a programming notation that allows program code and (sequential) specification statements to be intermixed in programs during their development. The calculi make use of a well-defined notion of refinement between programs and, in particular, between an abstract specification and another, more concrete, specification.
To develop an implementation that satisfies the specification of the mine control system we make use of a refinement calculus for time-based processes [10, 11] . The basic philosophy behind the timed calculus is the same as for the sequential refinement calculi, however, because the basic model of the system is different, the timed refinement calculus differs.
As we are only concerned with the top-level design, we do not get down to the level of detailed program code, rather we produce a design consisting of a collection of processes which, in combination, satisfy the top-level specification. The design puts together the processes using operators such as piping and parallel combination, and gives a precise specification of each process in the form of a (timed) specification statement.
As examples of (timed) refinement laws we give two basic laws for refining one specification statement by another. The timed refinement calculus provides laws to allow refinement to various combinations of processes including piping, parallelism, etc. We introduce these laws below, where they are required, and summarise them in Appendix B.
Weaken assumption

A water pump
We propose to implement the water level control process with the use of an electric pump to remove water from the mine shaft. The process will continuously monitor the water level in the mine shaft, so that it may commence pumping water from the mine before the water level becomes dangerous. Since methane is an explosive gas, the pump must not be operated in its presence.
The minimum ability of the pump to remove water from the mine shaft is represented by PumpRating : DEPTH =TIME MaxH 2 Oin < PumpRating:
We model the pump by the times at which the pump is operating.
Pump Pumping : Flag
When the pump is installed in the mine and pumping, it should remove water at a rate at least equal to its rating, provided there is any water present.
Clearly the pump can be installed only if there is no impediment to water removal.
InstalledPump b = WaterRemovable PumpAction]
Once installed the pump must be controlled in such a way as to ensure the goals of WaterSystem. In order to ensure that water levels do not rise above DangerH 2 O we set a slightly lower water level,
which the pump control system will react to by turning on the pump. We assume that the reaction time of the control system,
is fast enough to ensure that the pump is turned on before the water level becomes dangerous.
Methane
Remember that we have assumed that high levels of methane make the use of machinery in the mine hazardous. It may not be safe to have the pump running during periods of high methane levels, so the controller should ensure that this does not occur. This may lead to lost pumping time of up to TooMuchCH 4 , as well as delays in turning the pump back on after each shutdown. Thus we must make even stronger assumptions about the reaction time. We require that the time lost due to methane interuptions is not sufficient to allow the water level to rise to dangerous levels
LostTime : TIME LostTime = ( and that it be short enough that the pump can be turned off before any of the hazards of high methane levels are manifested.
Controlling the pump
The control mechanism for the pump turns the pump on when the water level gets high, except when the methane level is too high. From PumpControl we know that the longest time during ∆ for which the pump may not be operating is LostTime (the maximum number of times the pump might have to be switched on times the reaction time, plus the maximum time it must be left off due to methane presence). Thus from Water we know that for any t : TIME in ∆, 
PumpControl
H 2 O(t) = H 2 O(inf ∆) + R t inf
Conclusions
A primary requirement for the specification of real-time systems is the ability to specify the timing aspects of such systems. In addition, real-time control systems typically have both discrete and analogue inputs and outputs. Hence any whole-system specification must be able to address both discrete and analogue properties of the system. The approach taken in this paper is to make use of topological continuous functions of time, as they both capture the timing aspects of the behaviour of a system and allow discrete and analogue signals to be discussed within a single framework. This approach, while perhaps novel in a computing science context, has strong precedents within physics and engineering. An additional useful notational device, also adapted from the phyical sciences, is the use of (physical) units to aid in the understanding and type compatibility checking of specifications.
The use of continuous observables, as opposed to the simple adoption of analogue time models, helps direct the specifier away from detailed considerations of the method by which a system must evolve through time. Instead, the specifier is encouraged to consider the desired properties of a system throughout all time or during critical periods of time, with minimal attention to the activities required to achieve these properties. That is, to state what must be true of the system, rather than what the system must do. This may be contrasted with recent work based on timed transition systems and automata, such as Real-Time Logic [9] , (Really) Temporal Logic [7] , Timed CSP [16] and CCS [20] , in which preoccupation with the actions which must occur inevitably leads to an algorithmic and evolutionary description of a system not always appropriate to the highest levels of the development process.
In a similar vein to the specification vocabulary presented in this paper is the Calculus of Durations [4] which also aims to describe the observable properties of realtime systems in terms of an interval based calculus of real-valued functions of time. The notation of the calculus of durations offers a higher level of abstraction, at the expense of some expressive power, but would benefit from using continuous functions as we do.
The sequential refinement calculus has been a significant breakthrough in providing a coherent framework for the systematic development of programs from specifications to code. The same overall philosophy has been adopted for the development of systems of processes that combine together to satisfy a specification. Central to the refine-ment calculus is the concept of a specification statement that describes the allowable behaviours of a system (or component process), and an important aspect of the specification statement is a clear separation between the assumptions that the system makes about its environment and the effect that it guarantees to achieve provided that the environment satisfies the assumptions.
The objective of the present paper has been to assess these techniques on a small but realistic case study of a mine control system. By making use of timed history predicates we have been able to develop a detailed specification of the desired behaviours of the mine control system. In addition, we have been forced to formalise a number of concepts that were not clear in the informal specification on which our work is based [2] . Our specification is also at a higher level of abstraction: it makes fewer assumptions about the design of an implementation, and concentrates on specifying those properties of a mine control system that all implementations must satisfy.
The development of a top-level design has been performed and a proof of correctness of the refinement presented. The refinement technique allows a system to be decomposed into components that may be implemented in hardware or software, or a combination of both, and allows for further decomposition of components into subcomponents, etc. The end product is a system of processes combined together with piping and parallel operators, and making use of hidden variables.
The application of the timed refinement calculus techniques to the refinement of a mine control system has been successful at high-lighting the top-level design decisions, and verifying their validity before further development of the component processes is undertaken.
